



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY

## Fragility Risks of Low Latency Dynamic Queuing in Large-Scale Clouds: Complex System Perspective

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### **Outline**

- Empirical observations & modeling perspectives
- Markov model and approximations of systemic risk
- Cloud models
- Gradual vs. abrupt instabilities
- Implications for Internet transport
- Conclusion, future research





#### **Complex/Networked Systems: Empirical Observations**



#### Inherent connectivity systemic benefit/risk tradeoff

Connectivity is economically driven (rich gets richer, economy of scale, risk sharing, etc.) Economics fail to address systemic risks of: (cyber)security, cascading failures, etc.

Conventional Risk Management: use historical data to extrapolate, i.e., "fight the last war".

Challenge: unexpected consequences due to

- *externalities* due to strategic selfish or malicious (cybersecurity, terrorism) components
- non-linear component interactions, randomness, e.g., stochastic resonance

**Ultimate Goal**: systemic risk/benefit control through combination of regulations/incentives



### Markov Micro-description

Markov process with locally interacting components [R. Dobrushin, 1971]



Graph: nodes=components, (directed) links=interactions



Internal node dynamics  $X_n(t)$  Markov process with transition rates dependent on internal states of neighbors

System microstate:  $X(t) = (x_1(t), ..., x_N(t))$ 

Non-steady and steady probabilities  $P(t, X) = \Pr(X(t) = X)$ ,  $P(X) = \lim_{t \to \infty} P(t, X)$  are solutions to the corresponding Kolmogorov equations.

Kolmogorov system's dimension ~ exp(N) => solution intractable, metastability

In "very particular case" of time reversible Markov process,  $P(X) \sim exp[U(X)]$ Local minima of potential U(X) = metastable states (Landau theory of phase transitions)

In a general case we use mean-field approximation based on "hypothesis of chaos propagation":

$$P(t,X) \approx \prod_{n=1}^{N} P(t,x_n)$$



#### Individual & Systemic Risks



Negative externalities: 
$$\delta_{-n}^{1} \leq \delta_{-n}^{2} \Rightarrow E[\delta_{n} | \delta_{-n}^{1}] \leq E[\delta_{n} | \delta_{-n}^{2}]$$
  
where  $\delta_{-n} = (\delta_{i}, i \neq n)$ 

Individual risk:  $s_n = E[\delta_n \chi_n(\delta_{-n})]$ 

where  $\chi_n(\delta_{-n}) = 0(1)$  depending whether Individual risk can (can't) be transferred to the neighboring components

Example: 
$$S_n = E \left[ \delta_n \prod_{i \in J_n} \delta_j \right]$$
 when  $\chi_n(\delta_{-n}) = \prod_{i \in J_n} \delta_i$ 

Lorenz, J., Battiston, S., and Schweitzer, F. 2009

Systemic risk: 
$$S = \left(\sum_{n} w_{n} s_{n}\right) / \left(\sum_{n} w_{n}\right)$$



### **Cloud: Operational Model**



Server group j: operational with prob.  $1 - f_{ai}$ non-operational with prob.  $f_i^j$ 

Failures/recoveries on much slower time scale than job arrivals/departures

Static load balancing is possible if:

$$f_j = 0, \quad \rho_j = 1 - O(N_j^{-1/2 + \alpha})$$

where utilization is  $\rho_i = \Lambda_i / (N_i c_i)$  and  $\alpha \ge 0, N_i \rightarrow \infty$ 

Problems:  $f_i > 0$ , exogenous load uncertain, other uncertainties. Possible solution: dynamic load balancing based on dynamic utilization, e.g., numbers of occupied servers, queue sizes, etc.

Problem: serving non-native requests is less efficient:  $C_{ii} < C_i$ ,  $i \neq j$ 

and according to A.L. Stolyar and E. Yudovina (2013) this may cause instability of "natural" dynamic load balancing



### Cloud: Markov Model

Failures/recoveries on much slower time scale than job arrivals/departures

$$\Omega(\omega) = \prod_{i=1}^{I} [f_i^{\omega_i} (1 - f_i)^{1 - \omega_i}], \quad \text{where}$$

 $\omega_i = 0, (1)$  if server group i is operational (non-operational)

Loss probability for class i jobs is:

$$L_{i}(\omega) = \left(1 - \alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i}E\left[\prod_{j \in J_{i}} \delta_{j} | \delta_{i} = 1, \omega\right]\right)E[\delta_{i} | \omega], \text{ where }$$

 $\delta_i = 0,1$  if server group i is, or respectively, is not available

 $q_i$  probability that class i job is admitted to the native server group  $\alpha_i$  probability that class i job attempts for non-native service if  $\delta_i = 1$  $J_i$  characterizes system topology

**Markov description is intractable** even for moderate size systems since it requires solving  $\sim 2^{I+N+B}$  Kolmogorov equations for  $2^{I}$  vectors  $(\omega_i)$ 



## **Cloud: Mean-field & Fluid Approximations** $E\left[\prod_{i \in \{i\}} \delta_i | \omega\right] \approx \prod_{i \in \{i\}} \overline{\delta}_i(\omega_i), \quad \text{where}$

$$\begin{split} & \delta_i = 0, (1) \quad \text{if server group i has (does not have) available resources} \\ & \overline{\delta}_i(\omega_i) = \omega_i + (1 - \omega_i)\widetilde{\delta}_i, \qquad \widetilde{\delta}_i \approx \frac{\frac{(N_i \widetilde{\rho}_i)^{N_i + B_i}}{N_i! N_i^{B_j}}}{\sum\limits_{k=0}^{N_i} \frac{(N_i \widetilde{\rho}_i)^i}{k!} + \frac{(N_i \widetilde{\rho}_i)^{N_i}}{N_i!} \frac{1 - \widetilde{\rho}_i^{B_i + 1}}{1 - \widetilde{\rho}_i}} \end{split}$$

Informally: utilizations of different server group are jointly statistically independent and described by Erlang distribution with loads determined by self-consistency conditions, i.e., mean-field equations:

$$\widetilde{\delta}_i = \varphi_i(\widetilde{\delta}), \ i = 1,..,I$$

In a case of large server groups:  $N_i + B_i \rightarrow \infty$ , fluctuations are negligible:  $\widetilde{\delta_i} = \max(0, 1-1/\widetilde{\rho_i})$ , resulting in fluid approximation.





### Symmetric Cloud: Loss Model



Revenue loss vs. exogenous load for different levels of resource sharing

Revenue loss vs. resource sharing level for medium exogenous load

#### Implications:

- for sufficiently low level of resource sharing no metastability
- as resource sharing level increases, metastability emerges
- performance in the "normal" ("congested") metastable state gets better (worse)
- economics drives system operator towards stability boundary



### Symmetric Cloud: Queuing Model





Small service groups: discontinuity in queue size vs. exogenous load for sufficient level of resource sharing

#### Implications:

- for sufficiently low level of resource sharing no discontinuous instability
- as resource sharing level increases, discontinuous instability emerges
- performance in the "normal" ("congested") metastable state gets better (worse)
- economics drives system operator towards stability boundary



### **Resource Sharing Drivers**

Generic: economy of scale Specific: multiplexing gain due to mitigating local imbalances

We propose to quantify benefits of resource sharing by operational region increase

Inefficiency of accommodating component i's individual risk/load by component j



$$\chi_{ij} > \chi_{ii} = 1, \ i \neq j$$

System operational region without: risk sharing OAEBO:

#### $\rho_i \leq 1$

System operational region with complete risk sharing OACEDBO:

 $\rho_i + \chi_{ji} (C_j / C_i) [\rho_j - 1]^+ \leq 1$ 

where:  $[x]^+ := \max(0, x)$ 



#### **Operational Region Boundary: Gradual/Abrupt Instability**



High level of resource sharing

**Thesis:** since instabilities are unavoidable due to exogenous demand variability, hardware break downs, etc., systemic risk management should favor gradual rather than abrupt instability on the boundary of the operational region.

#### Motivation:

- Gradual instabilities may be signaled by critical slowdown, anomalous fluctuations, etc. [M. Scheffer, et al., Early-warning signals for critical transitions, *Nature*, 2009].
- Abrupt/discontinuous instabilities may cause unacceptably high performance deterioration as system gets outside operational region.
- Abrupt/discontinuous instabilities are typically associated with undesirable metastable states inside operational region.



### **Perron-Frobenius Measure of Systemic Risk**

Mean-field equations:  $\widetilde{\delta}_i = \varphi_i(\widetilde{\delta}), \ i = 1,..,N$ 

Key features of these equations linearized about "normal" equilibrium:

have a form of fixed-point system

• inside operational region have low systemic risk (normal) solution:  $S \approx 0$ 

• non-negative due to negative externalities: local overload overflows to neighboring components.

Since "normal" equilibrium loses stability as **Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue** of the linearized system  $\delta = A\delta$  crosses point  $\gamma(A) = 1$  from below, **system stability margin and risk of cascading overload can be quantified** by

$$\Delta(A) = 1 - \gamma(A)$$

In particular, condition of gradual instability on the boundary of operational region in terms of Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of the linearized mean-field system under fluid approximation just outside operational region:

$$\gamma(A) < 1 \iff \Delta(A) > 0$$

This in effect condition that the **boundary** of operational region is "safe."

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce



### Feasible and Safe Parameter Regions



Performance loss vs. resource sharing.



Feasible and safe regions.

Revenue loss at the operational regime boundary:  $L = [\gamma L + bL^2 + cL^3]^+$ 

Feasible parameter region:  $F = \{ \alpha : \gamma(\alpha) < 1 \}$ 

Safe parameter region:  $F_* = \{ \alpha : \gamma(\alpha) < 1, b(\alpha) < 0 \}$ 

Systemic risk of abrupt/discontinuous instability:  $R := 1 - \Pr(\gamma < 1, b < 0)$ 



#### **Effect of Bounded Rationality**

Consider bounded rationality due to uncertain exogenous demand ~
ho



- $F := F_1 \bigcup F_2$ : operational equilibrium  $\widetilde{\delta} = 0$  stable
- $F_1\left(F_2
  ight)$ : operational equilibrium  $\widetilde{\delta}=0$  globally (locally) stable

-  $F^{\,c}$  : operational equilibrium  $\widetilde{\mathcal{S}}=0$  unstable

Implication: bounded rationality may increase global stability region (C)



### Implications for Internet Transport: TCP + Congestion-aware Routing => Instability

P. Echenique, J. Gomez-Gardenes, and Y. Moreno, "Dynamics of jamming transitions in complex networks," 2004.



h=1: congestion oblivious (minimum hop count) routing h=0: congestion aware routing

Minimum-cost routing Route cost:

$$C_i = hd_i + (1-h)q_i$$

- $d_i$  # hops from node i to the destination
- $q_i$  queue length at node i

Congestion-aware routing *robust* to small *yet fragile* to large-scale congestion **Benefit**: lower network congestion for medium exogenous load from A1 to A2 **Risk**: hard/severe network overload (discontinuous phase transition) at A2 Economics drives system to the stability boundary A2.



### **User Defined Routing: Braess Paradox**

Braess paradox, (1969): infrastructure expansion/redundancy may do harm

4000 selfish travelers choose minimum cost/delay route Without link AB: Delay=2000/100+45=65

After adding link AB: Delay=4000/100+4000/100=80

Price of Anarchy (PoA) = 80/65





Externalities depend on m: m=0, no externalities, PoA=1 m>0: negative externalities, PoA>1

Upper bound for PoA independent of network topology (T. Roughgargen, 2002) m=1: PoA ~ 1.333

m=2: PoA ~ 1.626 m=3: PoA ~ 1.896

m: PoA ~ m/ln(m)

Randomness may cause abrupt deterioration of user defined routing performance due to discontinuous instability (word of caution for SDN)



#### **Congestion-aware Routing: Analytical Modeling**



Arriving request is routed directly if possible, otherwise an available 2-link transit route. Performance: request loss rate *L*.

Risk amplification: load increase  $\rightarrow$  more transit routes  $\rightarrow$  load increase ... Result: cascading overload

Mitigation technique: trunk reservation





Initial results: randomness may cause abrupt instability for TCP with congestion-aware routing and Multi-Path TCP, fairness mitigates



## **Conclusions & Future Research**

#### **Conclusions:**

- Since systemic instabilities are unavoidable, system designers/ operators should avoid abrupt in favor of gradual systemic instabilities
- Existence of inherent tradeoff between economic efficiency under normal conditions and risks of cascading overload/failure resulting in abrupt transition to persistent undesirable state.
- Due to negative externalities, operational equilibrium loses stability in a single dimension determined by the P-F eigenvector, and stability margin is determined by the P-F eigenvalue.

#### Future research:

- Verification/validation mean-field approximation through simulations, measurements and rigorous analysis (doubtful).
- Possibility of online measurement of the P-F eigenvalue as a basis for "early warning system."
- Possibility of controlling Networked Systems through a combination of regulations and pricing, based on the P-F eigenvalue.





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# Thank you!